Introduction

The concept of phenomenology in the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a complex theme that often appears in his writings, particularly in his Remarks on Colour. Wittgenstein’s approach to phenomenology differs significantly from how the term is commonly understood today. This article delves into Wittgenstein’s view on phenomenology, contrasting it with other philosophical traditions, especially the movement started by Edmund Husserl.

Finding the Core of Phenomenology

Wittgenstein often discusses phenomenology in the context of his broader philosophical projects. Unlike the methodological approach of phenomenology as commonly understood, Wittgenstein treats phenomenology as a collection of ideas rather than a rigid method. This collection invites questions about whether an object belongs in it, rather than strictly defining it through a set of rules.

Consider the following: just because something works as shown, it does not mean it works as said. This point holds true whether we substitute phenomenology.

Limitations of Language and Reality

Wittgenstein’s famous statement, “the limits of our language are the limits of our world,” highlights the struggle when we cannot articulate certain aspects of reality. This can create a sense of entrapment. However, maintaining an attitude of acceptance is key to overcoming this.

The Nature of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s Writings

Wittgenstein’s references to phenomenology are thinly scattered. There is little direct evidence that he was familiar with the work of phenomenologists like Husserl. But, in the early 1930s, he did think of his philosophical project as phenomenology. He defined it as an atheoretical and hypothesis-free description of immediate experience, and a language designed to contain synthetic a priori propositions – essential aspects of the phenomena being described.

However, Wittgenstein soon rejected this conception. He did not reject every feature of this conception, but scholars debate the reasons and extents of his rejection. His post-1946 remark in Remarks on Colour directly references his earlier rejection of phenomenology.

Phenomenological Problems in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

In Remarks on Colour, several phenomenological problems arise, particularly in the explication of color concepts. These problems include questions about the organization of color concepts, the meaning of sameness and difference, and whether such a procedure is possible or helpful. For example:

How do we organize color concepts? What does sameness and difference of color mean? How do we pinpoint subtle changes in color? Can shiny greys and blacks exist? Is white a neutral color? How does the attribution of shine or neutrality vary with the actual thing which holds the color?

Wittgenstein suggests that these questions are valid but that there is still no such thing as phenomenology as commonly understood. Instead, the logical investigation of these problems is crucial. Such an investigation would involve careful consideration of the sorts of things we say about phenomena, rather than a systematic hypothetical approach.

Comparative Analysis

Comparing Wittgenstein’s final conception of phenomenology with the Husserlian and post-Husserlian traditions could reveal valuable insights. It may be noted that Wittgenstein’s criticism still applies, but a more detailed study would be required.

Conclusion

The exploration of phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, as presented in Remarks on Colour, is a nuanced and challenging topic. While there is much to learn from comparing it with other philosophical traditions, the speculative nature of Wittgenstein’s writings necessitates careful interpretation. Despite the complexity, the study of phenomenology in Wittgenstein offers profound insights into the nature of experience and the limits of language.